Tacit Knowledge and the Epistemology of Expertise in Strategic Marketing Management by Hackley, Chris
European
Journal of
Marketing
33,7/8
720
European Journal of Marketing,
Vol. 33 No. 7/8, 1999, pp. 720-735.
# MCB University Press, 0309-0566
Tacit knowledge and the
epistemology of expertise in
strategic marketing
management
Christopher E. Hackley
Oxford Brookes University School of Business, Oxford, UK.
Keywords Epistemology, Knowledge, Marketing management, Strategic marketing
Abstract Discusses issues concerning the relationship between codified marketing theory and
practical strategic marketing expertise, particularly with respect to the importance of `` tacit'' or
unarticulated knowledge. The trajectory of argument draws attention to the role of words as
symbolic modelling devices and explores implications of this position for theorising marketing
expertise. Makes use of a multidisciplinary perspective and draws material from work in cognitive
science, the psychology of expertise and the philosophy of science. Sets the problematisation of
practical theory in marketing within a broader context of a possible epistemological `` crisis'' of
rationality in practical disciplines. The conclusion suggests that an epistemology of expertise for
marketing management demands both theoretical and linguistic sophistication and implies a
pedagogic shift towards a model of philosophic enquiry in marketing.
Introduction
The idea that practical skill or expertise has a `` tacit'' or unarticulated
dimension poses deep epistemological problems for practical subjects (see
Polanyi, 1962; Goranzon and Florin, 1992). It entails asking questions such as
what is it to be very good (an expert) at something? How might expertise in a
practical field be modelled through talk and theory? Is this problematic? This
paper seeks to introduce these questions in the context of marketing
management at the strategic (i.e. non-routine, strategic management decision
making) level. It does so by drawing on the extensive psychological literature
on expertise (e.g. Reimann and Chi, 1989; Murphy and Wright, 1984) and it
attempts to relate these findings to issues in the development of marketing
theory (e.g. Hunt, 1991; O`Shaugnessy, 1992; Sheth et al., 1988). In attempting
this, the paper makes use of current work in the crossover between cognitive
science and marketing (e.g. Moutinho and Brownlie, 1995; Wierenga, 1990;
Talvinen, 1995) since this work is salutary in drawing attention to the
philosophical and linguistic dilemmas which reveal themselves when
academics try to extract the essence of marketing expertise. The underlying
theme of the paper is epistemological, since it asks `` what can we (academics)
know and tell about the highest levels of expertise in strategic marketing
management, and what is the rational basis of such knowing and telling?''
The discussion proceeds in four main sections. The first section places the
consideration of a tacit dimension of expert marketing knowledge within a
context of evolving debates in marketing theory. The second addresses some
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philosophical implications of the position that expertise in strategic marketing
management is a pre-linguistic socially mediated fact which is accessible to, yet
somehow stands apart from, language. The third section introduces
perspectives from cognitive science which bear heavily on the assumptions of
this paper and which offer clear illustrations of the problems and possibilities
of eliciting and codifying the knowledge which underlies practical expertise.
Finally, the themes are brought together in a speculative model which suggests
some possible conceptualisations of the tacit dimension in marketing
management expertise. The conclusion suggests some possible directions for
further research and theory development in strategic marketing management
expertise.
The `` tacit'' and debates in marketing theory
The rigor of the theoretical basis underpinning academic marketing
management has received its share of critical attention in recent years (see for
example, Brownlie et al., 1993, 1994; Hunt, 1991; Buttle, 1994; Weitz and
Wensley, 1992; Deshpande, 1983). However, this lively debate has not to date
been placed within the broader context of the equally vigorous current debate
concerning the epistemology of practical knowledge (Goranzon and Florin,
1992; Goranzon and Josefson, 1988). This latter debate involves cognitive
scientists and philosophers of education, science and knowledge and covers the
entire scope of the practical professional disciplines. Within marketing, these
issues concern the acquisition and performance of high level expertise at the
strategic level (Hackley, 1996; Hackley and Kitchen, 1997). A premise of this
discussion is that the connection between theory and expert practice in
academic marketing tends to be assumed rather than specified:
...strategic marketing theory has assigned a primacy to the product and its associated
marketing mix. Such theory has therefore only provided guidelines for incremental product
repositioning and marketing mix improvement, and spectacularly successful strategic
marketing acts continue to be assigned to the category of `` genius'' or `` art'' ± categories
beyond modernist analytical reach. (Cova and Svanfeldt, 1993, pp. 297-310 in Firat et al.,
1995).
This apparent neglect of a critical aspect of marketing management seems
anomalous in a practical discipline so unforgiving in its competitive
environment. It is axiomatic in academic strategic marketing management that
firms unable to maintain a perpetual state of excellence in their marketing
functions will be overtaken in the competitive race. Maintaining this state of
excellence requires expertise in strategic marketing management. The
application of findings from educational and cognitive psychology, and
strategic management, to marketing management has developed a basis for
conceptualising the strategic marketing practitioner task environment as one
which presents complex and ill-structured problems which emerge within
turbulence and uncertainty (Hackley, 1996; Hackley and Kitchen, 1997) and in
general management (Mintzberg et al., 1976). The highest levels of expertise in
this domain, as in other professional domains, depend upon an interaction of
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domain relevant knowledge, experience and creativity (above references and
Reimann and Chi, 1989; Murphy and Wright, 1984; Henry, 1991). Large
amounts of marketing knowledge are codified in popular texts and constitute a
public discourse. However, much of the knowledge underpinning practical
marketing expertise may be tacit, implicit in the day-to-day problem solving of
strategic marketing practitioners but difficult to elicit from experts or to codify
in public symbols. This is a problematic feature not simply of marketing but of
every practical discipline (Goranzon and Josefson, 1988; Polanyi, 1962). This
implies that high level expertise in marketing involves cognitive performance
which goes beyond marketings codified body of knowledge.
Something is known about the acquisition of professional practical
expertise. The interactive function of knowledge, experience, time and
individual predisposition is well researched in fields which can be relatively
routinised (e.g. Murphy and Wright, 1984; Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986;
Anderson, 1980; Bhaskar and Simon, 1977; Cormier and Hagman, 1987; and
review with respect to marketing in Hackley and Kitchen, 1997). However, it is
problematic whether codified knowledge bases of practical disciplines deal
adequately with the question of how expertise may be acquired, promoted and
fostered through theoretical learning. Marketing is one such practical discipline
and one that has endured a more thorough going internal debate concerning its
knowledge claims than many others. The influence this debate has had on
marketing's curriculum and research agenda is difficult to establish (e.g. Buttle,
1994). Mainstream managerial marketing discourse is replete with normative
models of strategic managerial marketing practice such as the product life
cycle (Levitt, 1960; Kotler, 1994; Patten, 1959), the `` four Ps'' marketing mix
conceptual framework (McCarthy, 1981), models of strategic portfolio
management and competitive strategy (Porter, 1980; Kotler 1994; Ansoff, 1965;
Abell, 1978), not to mention many generic, generalised descriptive models of
buyer behaviour, advertising communication, product conceptualisation and so
on. The issue of the extent to which these models constitute a suitable
theoretical basis for the practical discipline of marketing management has been
extensively debated from a variety of positions within academic and practical
marketing (e.g. O'Shaugnessy, 1992; Hunt, 1991; Brownlie et al., 1993, 1994;
Hackley, 1998). The question of the heuristic power of these models or
explanatory sketches is an important one since the most prominent and
powerful school of thought within academic marketing is the managerial
school of marketing (Sheth et al., 1988). From the perspective of this school,
marketing is conceived primarily as a managerial function serving the
instrumental needs of the firm. The practical utility of the marketing
knowledge base is therefore an issue that is critical to the integrity of this view
of marketing. However, the question of how, and to what extent, managerial
marketing's theoretical models promote, re-produce and frame practical
expertise in the domain has not been directly addressed in academic marketing.
The normative bias in mainstream managerial marketing theory can perhaps
be accounted for by the prominence of the managerial school. However, the
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critical literature argues that this normative bias is not adequately
substantiated. How might an appreciation of the tacit, unarticulated aspects of
expert knowledge contribute to marketing management theory?
Tacit and public knowledge in academic marketing
Philosophical questions of marketing science
In this paper the `` tacit'' dimension of practical knowledge refers to those
particulars of action which are necessarily omitted, to varying degrees, from
abstracted theoretical descriptions, yet upon which the successful
accomplishment of practical action depends. This, incidentally, is not to imply
that the metaphysical `` space'' between the world of concepts and the world of
sense experience can be adequately bridged by marketing theory. It is meant to
suggest that practical talk and theorising (about marketing management)
cannot afford to assume that this metaphorical space is irrelevant, or that the
nature of it is unproblematic. To take a simple example, the marketing `` mix''
analogy (McCarthy, 1981) is a ubiquitous feature in the most popular
marketing texts and courses. While the `` mix'' offers a convenient and simple
way of talking, by analogy, about things a marketing manager might have to
consider in a given marketing situation, it nevertheless constitutes a verbal
model which cannot reproduce the experiential dimension of dealing very
effectively with such issues. The situational particulars of any given marketing
situation, which are the very elements through and with which high level
expertise must be practised, remain tacit in such a model. It cannot replicate the
situational particulars which frame practical action, and the more case detail
that is added to a teaching situation, the less likely the case will be to resemble
any practical marketing situation. Consequently, the normative dimension to
marketing teaching conducted by such models seems problematic (Hackley,
1998), at least in respect of high level expertise. The point at issue here is not
whether strategic marketing can, as a human experience, be verbally modelled,
but what form of models might be appropriate in a training and education
situation. How can expertise, i.e. being very good indeed at an aspect of
marketing at the strategic level, be fostered, promoted, learned, in respect of the
tacit elements present in practical action but difficult to represent in abstract
modelling situations?
The notion of the `` tacit'' in practical knowledge is used here in the context of
the psychology of expertise. Psychological expertise research takes a cognitive
perspective on the way actors subsume the details of particular phenomena
within abstracted concepts which are then applied, as forms of cognitive
schemata, to problems of action (for general examples from cognitivist
psychological research into memory and knowledge representation see
Rumelhart and Norman (1983), Kotovsky et al. (1985), Schank (1981). For
example, in chess and physics, experts and novices differ in respect of the
concepts they utilise in modelling problems: the experts' concepts are packed
with contingent possibilities, while the novices' are rather threadbare, focusing
on concrete operations. The research area of managerial cognition seeks to
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elicit the components of managerial decision making by cognitively `` mapping''
them (e.g. Huff, 1990; Schank and Abelson, 1977; Eden, 1992; Swan, 1997 for
overview). The codification of such action schemata into theoretical knowledge
remains problematic, particularly with respect to the specificity of action
schemata to domains of managerial and marketing activity. In marketing, a
person who is capable of highly successful accomplishment (expertise) in
strategic decisions concerning, say, new product development, the planning
and implementation of marketing communications campaigns, commissioning
and interpreting marketing research, recruiting marketing staff and so on, is
likely to utilise highly sophisticated, abstract, experientially mediated concepts
in the formulation of and heuristic search with respect to, marketing problems.
Representations of expertise tend to have a high order of domain specificity
(Mandler, 1962) so there is a case for dealing separately with each marketing
and management domain. However, this paper is seeking to set out some
parameters for further development of these issues in academic marketing, so
for current purposes `` strategic'' level marketing management is regarded as a
generic category which may well be subject to further refinement and
differentiation through subsequent research. The issue in question here
concerns the epistemological basis of theories of expertise in strategic level
marketing. The next section attempts to address this by looking at the material
we have available for getting at expertise in marketing: that is, expert talk.
The epistemological status of expert talk in marketing
Can we derive theory from the things expert marketers say about what they
do? There is a philosophical issue at stake here concerning the (problematic)
distinction between action, and linguistic signifiers of action. To take an
essentially structuralist perspective, we can say that, where a person is asked
to introspect about their mental processes in practising their professional
activity, their answer must reflect the linguistic presuppositions of the
discipline in which they operate (Hirst, 1987). If a marketer is asked by an
academic how she does marketing, an intelligible response must necessarily
draw upon publicly available meanings. In other words, the publicly codified
(in verbal symbols) knowledge of a discipline provides the conceptual
vocabulary for discourse among practitioners, academics and the wider public.
This public knowledge does not constitute a cognitive psychology of expertise
in the domain in that it seems to stands apart from the private, possibly pre-
linguistic constituents of practical action. On this view, the ontological status of
practical knowledge resides in the conceptual vocabulary of a discipline's
discourse. Wittgenstein (1968) alluded to this position in marking a distinction
between signifiers (in this case, words) and the thing signified (problem-solving
cognition with respect to marketing action).
The early Wittgenstein took an extreme position on the question of whether
a `` private'' language, i.e. one that is not socially constituted, is possible at all
(Wittgenstein, 1968). Notwithstanding this argument, we can see there are
difficulties in asking experts to articulate the mental processes underlying their
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expertise. Are these processes accessible to the experts? If so, are their
articulations accessible to us? Ask marketing managers with marketing
qualifications how they solve problems and they will very likely offer an
explanation which utilises the concepts with which they conduct their
professional discourse. In fact, the implication of the positions taken by Popper
(1972) and Wittgenstein (1968) on public discourse is that they can do no other.
To reiterate then, codified marketing knowledge, like any other form of
practical knowledge, has a relation to professional practice which is not
necessarily reflective of the cognitive style of experts within its domain. That
is, high level expertise in strategic marketing is not what the books say. As
mentioned above, marketing is not alone in this. A doctor cannot learn to be an
expert from books alone and neither can a plumber, a footballer or a
hairdresser. Michael Polanyi (1962) wrote that `` we can know more than we can
tell'' and a similar theme runs through much philosophy of knowledge,
including the work of, for example, Wittgenstein (1968) and Kuhn (1962). For
Kuhn (1962), the usually implicit paradigmatic assumptions underpinning
practice in normal science set the terms of reference for practitioners. But,
crucially, Kuhnian science makes radical progress when a set of paradigmatic
assumptions ceases to be implicit. Made explicit, they are judged inadequate
and are superseded by a new paradigm. Seen in this way, it may be argued that
the pre-eminence of the articulated aspect of knowledge has been fundamental
to the extraordinary progress of Western science (Molander, 1992). Knowledge
that remains tacit, uncodified and embedded in a cultural frame of meaning, to
use a Giddensian term (Giddens, 1993), cannot form the basis of science.
Scientific progress might be said to consist in deconstructing tacit knowledge
from one frame of meaning and reconstructing it explicitly in another. For the
present argument, we are concerned with the marketing practitioner frame of
meaning and the deconstruction of the tacit knowledge underlying expertise in
marketing management at the strategic level, and the reconstruction of this
knowledge in an explicit codified form consistent with the frame of meaning of
the wider academic community.
The problem of the elicitation of knowledge from experts has been one with
which cognitive scientists have wrestled in the drive to design computerised
expert systems which can perform tasks of complex human problem solving
(e.g. Anderson, 1980). This work has resulted in several conceptualisations of
practical knowledge which may help to shed light on the distinction between
theoretical knowledge and practical expertise in strategic marketing
management. The work on expert systems described below does not merely
offer practitioner orientated marketing academics a clear illustration of the
notion of the tacit dimension of knowledge. It may also offer the most telling
insights into the fundamental problems of theorising about practical action,
problems which marketing does not adequately address. In view of its
importance to the central themes of this paper, this section deals with expert
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systems from first principles and attempts to carefully draw out the
connections with the psychology of expertise, and the possible components of
expertise in strategic marketing management.
Expert systems and practical knowledge for strategic marketing
management
An `` expert system'' is a computer programme which is designed to reproduce
the problem solving behaviour of a human expert in a particular domain of
application (Baldwin, 1987). An essential feature of expert systems is that they
draw inferences from a knowledge base on the basis of `` if x, then y'' logical
procedures. Work in the design of computerised expert systems for artificial
intelligence constitutes, so it has been argued, an epistemological revolution
(Janik, 1988) which will change the philosophical assumptions underpinning
notions of knowledge in practical activities. Designing an expert system entails
eliciting knowledge from human experts and converting it into a binary form
for computer programming. The design of such systems requires every step in
problem solving reasoning to be made explicit and this process has been
salutary in problematising the relationship between experience, language and
communication. Nevertheless, the expert knowledge thus obtained can enable
machines to conduct or assist low level human decision-making operations.
Expert systems have been built in domains such as medical diagnosis,
engineering fault finding, vision and speech recognition, robotics,
manufacturing and banking (Baldwin, 1987), in chess, in weather forecasting
and also in marketing management (Moutinho and Brownlie, 1995; Proctor and
Ruocco, 1992; Proctor, 1991; Wierenga, 1990). Talvinen (1995) has extensively
reviewed the considerable amount of recent work in expert systems for
marketing management decision support. This large volume of work is
indicative of the considerable interest in, and potential for, marketing
applications of expert systems. Notwithstanding this work, the success and
scope of expert systems in the kind of complex creative problem solving
demanded in strategic marketing remains to be established. Expert systems are
not yet able to learn to solve complex problems which demand creativity. In
particular, the metaphoric character of language cannot, it seems, be fully
captured in a computer programme. Among the highly problematic features of
the use of expert systems in qualitative decision making in professional
domains there is a perceived danger that the kind of (binary) codification of
knowledge which expert systems demand may leave out those very tacit
elements of discretion which are indispensable in successful human problem
solving (Neilson, 1987; Ostberg, 1988).
Constructions of expert knowledge in strategic marketing
Designing an effective expert system, then, requires that the designers are able
to explicitly state every respect in which knowledge informs a decision-making
process, and this requirement for explicitness has emphasised the importance
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of tacit or unarticulated knowledge in practical skill. What forms might this
aspect of knowledge take in marketing expertise?
Strategic marketing management constitutes a domain of practical activity
within which expertise resides in practitioners having an extensive domain
relevant knowledge base and a sophisticated set of rules for learning and
problem solving within the domain (Hackley, 1996). Marketing problems at this
level tend to be `` ill-structured'' (Mintzberg et al., 1976) and as such require
structuring by the problem solver (Hackley and Kitchen, 1997, Rickards, 1996).
This problem construction entails an order of creativity. To take a simple
example, the commissioning of appropriate market research is an important
skill in marketing management at the strategic level (Thomas, 1984). The
knowledge base involved in this skill would probably consist of a stock of
marketing research data gathering methods and techniques of inferential
statistics. To this extent the knowledge is no more than could be learned from
good texts by marketing undergraduates. However, the sophisticated set of
rules involved in practical expertise can only be developed through domain
relevant problem solving experience. This point alludes to the problem of
transfer of learning from a modelling environment to a professional practice
environment (Mandler, 1962). It is often difficult to ascertain which modelling
(training, education) activities will furnish a person with the rules of practical
expertise. These rules enable, for example, a skilled marketer to make problem
sensitive judgements about formulating their research problem, specifying the
most appropriate research method within the context of the product/market
conditions and the constraints of the budget, assessing the limitations of the
research and evaluating the results in such a way as to generate useful insights
into the marketing problem the research is designed to help solve. These
insights result in the expert marketer forming and refining a heuristic or rule of
thumb for solving their problem. The power of this heuristic in solving the
problem depends on the high level skill of the marketer. This high level skill or
expertise in marketing problem solving may be described as `` creative'' and is
founded on extensive knowledge and experience.
Expert systems require knowledge to be programmed into the computer in a
timeless propositional form. Practical human expertise on the other hand is
temporally mediated. The expert evolves, learning from all experience, relating
new theoretical or empirical knowledge to existing knowledge structures in
memory and subsuming knowledge within a larger and increasingly complex
conceptual organisation (Novak, 1977). On this view, knowledge in memory is
not static: it undergoes, in an active learner, a perpetual re-evaluation in the
light of new knowledge. So, on this line of reasoning, strategic marketing
management theories of expertise should entail conceptual frameworks which
offer the possibility of subsuming large areas of practical specificity in a
logically coherent relation to the theoretical knowledge, in order to assist in
practical marketing problem solving. How then, might practical experience in a
strategic area of marketing develop into a level of problem solving
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accomplishment which constitutes expertise, and what might the implications
be for talking about (theorising about) marketing expertise in the academic
context?
Marketing theory and the acquisition of expertise in marketing
management
Expertise in a practical discipline can be thought of as the pinnacle of a scale of
accomplishment which begins with the category `` novice'' and runs through
intermediate stages of expertise acquisition (Dreyfuss and Dreyfuss, 1986). In
this paper we are concerned with the highest level of accomplishment in this
hierarchy. Cognitive scientists such as Anderson (1980, 1983) have
conceptualised expertise acquisition as a cognitive process of proceduralising
declarative knowledge. Declarative, sometimes known as propositional
knowledge, consists in the factual knowledge of the domain and may be
expressed as a series of declarative statements. Procedural or practical
knowledge consists in detailed experientially moderated problem-solving
procedures. Expertise is acquired as practitioners proceduralise and refine their
declarative factual knowledge through direct interaction with domain relevant
problems. This division of knowledge follows Ryle's (1959) philosophical
division of knowledge into the `` knowing that'' and the `` knowing how''. Experts
in a domain must have knowledge of the facts of their domain and must also
know how to utilise this knowledge to solve domain related problems. Such
problems in the domain of marketing management might include the following,
derived from Hackley (1996), following Thomas (1984):
. How to . . . gather and select relevant information from the business
environment to make predictions about market opportunities.
. How to . . . be innovative at a strategic level seeking new product
opportunities which can form part of a strategic vision for the
organisation.
. How to . . . communicate the benefits of marketing within the
organisation.
. How to . . . optimise the marketing mix to achieve stated objects.
Professional expertise in solving these problems successfully and repeatedly
requires a substantial knowledge base of facts and procedures. Facts about the
empirical world (theoretically explicit, or theoretically tacit) may elucidate or
furnish the heuristic search, but in and of themselves cannot solve problems
and therefore cannot offer a model for a rational problem solving (Popper, 1968,
1972) science.
To some academics theoretical weakness in academic managerial marketing
need not matter (Charnes et al., 1985), principally because it is a practical
activity. To others, a theory in a practical discipline such as marketing must
cohere in some respect with practice in order to satisfy an important
(Popperian) criterion of rationality. For O`Shaugnessy (1992), marketing
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managers' action can be seen as resting upon rules and assumptions which
may be tacit (although he uses the word implicit). The public articulation of
these rules is the task of theory development in marketing. Given
O`Shaugnessy's (1992) view of the importance of theory development in
marketing, how might we conceptualise expert marketing action in terms of
such rules?
Forms of tacit knowledge in marketing expertise
Anderson (1980, 1983) conceptualised the acquisition of practical expertise as a
two stage process of utilising (proceduralising) declarative knowledge in
solving domain related problems. Through practice, novices advance along a
scale of expertise as their conceptual knowledge of the domain is expanded and
refined (Bhaskar and Simon, 1977; Chi et al., 1981). This experientially
mediated process entails the acquisition of subtle forms of knowledge
representation which are critical in exercising expertise but which are difficult
to articulate in words, i.e. they are `` tacit''.
As a thought experiment, we might reflect on what a model of tacit
knowledge in managerial marketing expertise might look like. Such a
conceptual model might indicate possible clues concerning the extent to which
marketing expertise may consist in a different order of knowledge from the
public, codified form extant in consultancy and academia. The knowledge
categories used in Table I are based on the categories deriving from cognitive
science and simplified as `` explicit propositional'' or `` tacit procedural''
knowledge. In this context, for simplicity, the notion of propositional
knowledge is used interchangeably with the notion of declarative knowledge.
The marketing skills are derived from Hackley (1996), following Thomas
(1984). Notwithstanding the anecdotal nature of the tacit knowledge
components of this speculative model, it is presented to help elucidate, on an
intuitive level, the general theme of this paper.
Clearly Table I demonstrates not only possible components of the tacit
dimension of marketing expertise but the difficulty of trying to talk about
these. The components of `` skill'' here are intended to illustrate degrees of
specificity in talking about action. For example, expertise in brand
management entails sensitivity to market changes. Models of portfolio and
product life cycle analysis may provide conceptual frameworks which mediate
between theory and action and this case. But the inference engine of the expert
would apply different rules to the interpretation of such models than that of the
novice. Indeed, it is well known that many successful marketing entrepreneurs
make no use at all of formal frameworks such as these.
However, this does not mean that knowledge does not intervene in the
cognition of marketing expertise. Expertise is not a mere `` knack'' or fortunate
cognitive style. It is a rigorous psychological finding that expertise is
constituted through a highly complex cognitive interaction of qualitatively
different forms of knowledge representation (Bhaskar and Simon, 1977, Chi et
al., 1981). The model above may suggest forms of knowledge which are present
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in the practice of marketing expertise, but which are not adequately addressed
in extant marketing theory, notwithstanding the use of business simulations
which encounter problems of context in transferability of learning (Cormier and
Hagman, 1987; Mandler, 1962). What, then might all this mean for research and
theory development in strategic marketing management expertise?
Concluding comments
This paper has sought to open up an interdisciplinary perspective on a
question which is under-addressed in marketing theory. In this undertaking the
paper has attempted to talk about the tacit. The problematisation of the tacit
dimension of practical expertise has profound potential implications for
marketing epistemology, as it does for all other practical disciplines. One view,
implied in this paper through references to Popper's (1968, 1972) problem
Marketing skill
Propositional/declarative
knowledge (Tacit) procedural knowledge
Commissioning
research
Research methodology,
statistical techniques
Problem sensitive knowledge of when to use a
particular research method to yield a suitable
problem-solving heuristic; ability to negotiate on
internal budget and external research costs: the
political skill to `` sell'' research findings to
colleagues to justify desired strategy
Environmental
analysis
Analytical tools (SWOT
etc.) data sources
Intuitive ability to draw predictive inferences
from static models to form dynamic real-world
hypotheses: ability to generate ideas at a
strategic level which create meanings for
consumers and which are within the production
capability of the firm
Product/brand
management
Quantitative techniques,
accounting/finance
techniques, production
techniques, knowledge
of legal constraints on
advertising claims,
models of portfolio
analysis and life cycle
analysis
Intuitive sensitivity to market changes, creative
qualities in acting in an independent inner-
directed way to establish product line
adaptations/changes and novel marketing
communications themes; political sensitivity to
the personalities within the organisation;
sensitivity to the organisation's strategic vision
Communicating
the benefits of
marketing within
the organisation
Textbook accounts of
the marketing concept,
of marketing as the
`` whole business seen
from the point of view
of the consumer'' of
salutary `` marketing
myopia'' type case
histories
Skills of augmentation, persuasiveness, charm,
verbal analytical intelligence to go beyond
textbook platitudes in discussing marketing
issues
Table I.
A conceptualisation of
explicit propositional
knowledge and tacit
procedural knowledge
in marketing
management
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solving criterion for scientific rationality, is that addressing the tacit dimension
of practical expertise is central to issues of epistemological rationality in
practical disciplines. Marketing theory's relation to practical expertise in
marketing seems critical in this respect. Furthermore, the preceding discussion
has implied that a natural science narrative of theory development does not
address the foregoing problem (Quine, 1969; Medawar, 1964; Lakatos, 1971)
because it fails to capture the tacit particulars, and the `` poetic'' character of
imaginative human expertise (Vico in Leach, 1976). The transition from the
positive premise to the normative prescription is a classical epistemological
dilemma which strategic marketing management, along with other practical
fields of codified theory, has not satisfactorily addressed. To return to the
question posed in the opening paragraph of the paper; what is it to be very good
indeed (an expert) at marketing management at strategic levels of decision
making, and how might theory in marketing model this expertise in such a way
as to promote its acquisition?
This question is broad and can be seen as in terms of a generalised call for
more sophisticated pluralistic practical theorising in marketing. Central to this
issue of pluralism in marketing theory is the question of the compatibility of
epistemologies which emphasise critical understanding and interpretation,
ontological realism or linguistic relativism. The implication here is that good
marketing theory must begin with epistemological considerations in order to
advance the intellectual connections between marketing theory and practical
expertise. Epistemological issues in turn require grounding in an ontological
framework which states assumptions concerning the nature or essence of the
social phenomenon under investigation (Kavanagh, 1994). Marketing
management education does indeed focus on a domain of practice in the world.
But an explicit acknowledgment of the tacit dimension in which practical
marketing management expertise is grounded can open up new and fertile
directions for marketing education, theory and research. Normative
prescriptions in managerial marketing diminish their subject matter and close
off enquiry. Astute marketing actors seek a naturalistic, experientially
mediated understanding of their social worlds. The role of theory in marketing
management education can be to make more of this kind of understanding
explicit.
This paper has placed particular emphasis on the problematic use of
language in conceptualising expertise in strategic marketing. The emphasis
taken in the paper places the philosophical status of language and its relation to
social action in a prominent position in the marketing expertise research
agenda. Put another way, in talking and theorising about doing marketing very
well (expertly) at the strategic level, what should words and language be?
For example, what are the implications of the illocutionary force of words for
the elicitation and codification of marketing expertise? It is well established in
social research that words can be implicated in the construction of meaning
both by what they say in respect of the concepts to which they refer, and in
what they do (i.e. their illocutionary force) in terms of the social
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accomplishments they achieve (see, for example, Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969;
Goffman, 1981; Mills, 1940; Harre and Stearns, 1995; and an overview
concerning talk at and about work in Case, 1995). What might this mean for the
elicitation and codification of marketing expertise? Should we look beyond the
scope of expert systems design towards a less socially solipsistic view of how a
marketing expert uses words to accomplish and to demonstrate her (or his)
expertise? Can research into managerial cognition (Swan, 1977) offer direction
to this question?
Second, to what extent can researchers in, say, marketing expert systems
take word-signs as indices of inner cognitive structures? Or does this
misrepresent the way that expert systems work? A semiotic (or semiological)
perspective locates the communicative properties of language within a field of
codes which are open to interpretation (e.g. Danesi, 1993; Sebeok, 1991). As
Sebeok (1991) points out with regard to the rich overlap between marketing and
semiotics (see, for example Bachand, 1992; Umiker-Sebeok et al., 1987; Hackley,
1999),
. . .in the marketing of goods, services and ideas, auxiliary verbal and non-verbal messages
are normally implied (Sebeok, 1991, p. 147).
This comment refers to the tacit (non-verbal) dimension of marketing messages
aimed at consumers. It thus problematises the message-meaning identity
implicit in cognitivist frameworks of marketing communications. More
generally, the naive view that language can represent a world of concepts
which in turn represent the structure of the world cannot sustain an
epistemology of marketing expertise.
Getting at marketing expertise, then, in order to develop theoretical models
of it which can assist in the acquisition of that expertise, is a delicate multi-
disciplinary undertaking which entails a subtly shifting pedagogic position
away from a model of prescription and towards a model of philosophically
informed enquiry. The conceptualisation and codification of practical
marketing expertise is only one half of the academic task: communicating this
knowledge to non-experts (including other kinds of expert) is the other half.
The problematisation of the role of theorising with language in this double
hermeneutic task can point towards the development of new, more
epistemologically sophisticated marketing theory which embraces larger areas
of the tacit in practical strategic marketing expertise.
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